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Abstract
Union density in Mexico has been in decline since the 1980s. This article
provides evidence on the worker compensation gains (losses)made bymales upon
joining (leaving) a union. These are estimated using a nationally representative
labour market survey covering 2005q1–2016q1. The transitions between non-
union and union status are investigated using a difference-in-difference estimator.
The ﬁndings suggest that joining a union is associated with modest wage gains,
contrary to what the literature has shown for most industrialized nations.
However, in contrast to this, some union leavers are found to experience a
decrease in wages. This article also contributes to the wider literature by
providing the ﬁrst estimates of the longitudinal gain (loss) associated with
joining (leaving) a union with respect to non-wage beneﬁts. The ﬁndings show
joining (leaving) a union increases (decreases) the probability of being in receipt
of legally guaranteed beneﬁts such as bonuses and paid holidays. This suggests
that although union density may be in decline, unions still have an important role
to play in voicing worker’s preferences with respect to compensation and ensuring
that employers comply with the law.
1. Introduction
Unions in Mexico have been in decline since the 1980s. Union density has
declined from a peak of approximately 14 per cent in 1984 of the male formal
labour force to its current rate of approximately 7.5 per cent. While density
fell in the 1990s, the early to mid-2000s witnessed a minor resurgence in
unionization rates. Yet, most information on the effects of unions relate
exclusively to that period. Even then, very little is known about the role of
unions in the face of macroeconomic adversity, and their role in bargaining
over non-pay packages. This article aims to investigate the union role along
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these dimensions for the recent 11-year period (2005–2016). Recent ﬁndings
by Gutierrez Rufrancos (2017) suggest that there is a sizeable raw mean wage
differential between union members and nonmembers (18–22 per cent). This
gap reduces to 6.7–13.8 per cent once worker characteristics are taken into
account. However, there is no recent evidence on the effects of unions with
respect to non-wage beneﬁts. Fairris (2006) investigates this issue for the
1990s and ﬁnds that unions tilt the whole of worker compensation towards
non-wage beneﬁts.
Given the existence of a wage gap attributable to unions, it is salient
to ask ‘Is there any beneﬁt/loss associated with transitioning in or out
of a union?’ This article will address the research question by carefully
disentangling the wage and non-wage beneﬁts to joining (leaving) a union.
The main contribution of this article is in the spirit of the suggestions of
Doucouliagos et al. (2018), this article provides the ﬁrst estimates of the short-
run longitudinal effects of unions onworker non-wage beneﬁts to the literature
for a developing country. A large sample of workers is investigated using
the Mexican Occupation and Employment Survey, a richly detailed labour
force survey conducted on a quarterly basis. This dataset comprises a rotating
panel with individuals interviewed for ﬁve consecutive quarters. I exploit
the panel dimension of these data to identify the union wage differential
as well as probability models of non-wage beneﬁts by exploiting worker
transitions in joining and leaving unions by using a differences-in-differences
identiﬁcation strategy.
The results reveal that in the short run, the average union joiner perceives
a 3.7 per cent increase in wages. When the data are disaggregated, it becomes
clear temporary contract workers who unionize — among some of the most
vulnerable workers — obtain a wage increase of 21.4 per cent relative to other
temporary non-unionized workers. No other wage effects are detected for any
other sub-group. Nevertheless, the probability of being in receipt of legally
mandated non-wage beneﬁts rises as a consequence of unionizing. This is
also found to be consistent across individuals either transitioning ﬁrms or
contract types.
The results for union leavers suggest that in the short run, they do
not perceive decreases in their wages, in particular once differences in
characteristics are taken into account. Temporary contract workers who leave
unions are the sub-group that ﬁnd their wages decrease by 32.4 per cent.
Equally, union leavers are found to have lower probabilities of holding legally
mandated non-wage beneﬁts.
The evidence provided is consistent with the voice concept originally
proposed by Freeman and Medoff (1984) suggesting that these effects remain
relevant today in Mexico. Unions through collective worker ensure that ﬁrms
provide all of the legally mandated beneﬁts to which a worker is entitled,
without taking reprisals on workers themselves. Leavers forfeit these beneﬁts,
perhaps in exchange formaintaining wages commensurate with their erstwhile
union bargained wage levels. Further, I consider the ‘facilitation’ effect of
unions proposed by Budd (2004, 2007) and conclude that while this may
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explain increases in awareness of non-wage beneﬁts for joiners, the loss in
mandatory beneﬁts suggests that facilitation is not consistent withmy ﬁndings
for the Mexican context.
The article is laid out as follows: I draw upon the developed country union
literature and provide a brief background to the legal requirements of the
Federal Labour Law in Section 2. The data are described in more detail in
Section 3. The methodology is detailed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the
empirical results, some robustness checks are presented in Section 6, and
ﬁnally Section 7 concludes.
2. Background
Federal Labour Law Provisions in Non-Wage Beneﬁts
My aim in this article is to investigate the effect of joining and leaving a
union. This effect will be investigated focusing on both the wages and the
non-wage components of remuneration. In the Mexican context, these are set
out by Article 123 of the Constitution and detailed by the Federal Labour
Law (FLL), which deﬁne the working conditions that a worker may expect
in employment. The Constitution creates a legal separation in the rights of
workers by their employment sector, as it has two separate subsections ‘A’
covering private sector workers, and ‘B’ dealing with public sector workers.
The FLL only applies to private sector workers. The labour rights of public
sector workers are subject to the Federal Law of State Workers. This duality
in law implies that there are actually very distinct legal regimes that cover the
beneﬁts and entitlements of public sector workers, as such this investigation
will focus solely on private sector workers.
The FLL outlines a number of mandatory non-wage beneﬁts that must
be provided directly by an employer. These include, but are not limited to
Aguinaldo, or Bonus. This is a mandatory annual payment that must be
equivalent to a minimum of 15 working days salary (Clause V Art. 89 FLL).
If the worker did not complete a full year at the ﬁrm, he or she is entitled to
the pro rata equivalent. If a worker leaves his or her employment, regardless
of voluntarily or involuntarily, prior to the bonus being paid out he or she is
entitled as part of his or her severance payments to take the proportion of the
bonus earned.
Chapter IV of the FLL entitles workers to six days of paid holiday once they
have been employed for a year, and each additional year at the ﬁrm secures
another day of paid leave. Once 12 days has been reached an additional two
days are accrued every ﬁve years with the ﬁrm. It should be noted that this does
not include national holidays, which are considered paid leave days, regardless
of one’s seniority at the ﬁrm.
The FLL and the Law of Social Security stipulate that all workers in an
worker–employer relationship must be registered with the Mexican Institute
of Social Security (IMSS). Registration to Social Security allows workers to
obtain certain beneﬁts such as health care and pensions.
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The FLL outlines the legal framework under which unions operate. Union
membership is deﬁned as voluntary, and the law states that one may join or
leave a union without being the subject of coercion. Joining a union may take
multiple forms. In principle, however, workers must form a new union, which
may then be associated with a larger national unions congress.When changing
jobs one may be able to enter a union to obtain a union contract. Any worker
over 14 years of age may join a union. All unions need to be registered to the
relevant Arbitration and Conciliation Commission.
A new ‘union’ cannot begin operations such as negotiating a collective
contract with an employer or engage in other activities such as strikes until
it is officially registered by an Arbitration and Conciliation Commission. The
FLLalso regulates the internal workings of unions, it requires that unions have
statues and freely elect their officers but the law falls short of explicitly calling
for secret ballots. Instead, elections of union members are stipulated by law to
occur during plenary sessions. This lack of anonymity coupled with exclusion
clauses have led to a democratic deﬁcit within unions associated with larger
confederations. This lack of internal democracy allows for union leadership
to become unaccountable to the rank-and-ﬁle members (Middlebrook 1995;
Fairris 2006; Bensusa´n and Middlebrook 2012).
Enshrined in the FLL is the freedom to both unionize and leave a union
(Art. 359 FLL). The law does not proscribe the procedure for voluntarily
leaving a union, and only lays out the rules for someone to be involuntarily
expelled from a union, for which a two-thirds majority based on a non-
secret vote is required. The details of leaving a union are left to each union’s
constitution. However, in general, leaving a union is an administratively
expensive affair. One may resign their union membership by writing a letter
formally doing so, and having it notarized. This will then need to be presented
for ratiﬁcation to the relevant Arbitration and Conciliation Commission.
Finally, this is presented to the union leadership. However, this may also
have implications for a worker’s contract. If the collective contract is for
unionized individuals, workers may need to reapply for their jobs to obtain a
role as a trabajador de conﬁanza, that is a non-unionized role within the same
ﬁrm. Although exits from the union sector through the formal institutional
approach are rare, this is nevertheless a feature of the Mexican labour
market.
Literature Review
The traditional neoclassical labour economics view on unions characterizes
them as monopolists. The absence of unions would see competition between
individuals for jobs, which would lead to ﬁrms offering market clearing pay
packages that reward the workers for their marginal contribution to the
production process. The composition of the pay packet should be attractive
to the marginal worker in order to ensure labour market competitiveness.
Thus, if workers were interested in better non-wage beneﬁts (e.g. pensions,
proﬁt-sharing, medical cover), they would settle for a job with a lower wage
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that provides better beneﬁts. In this view, unions distort the pay composition
of the remuneration package and increase it above the competitive level
through the threat of increasing ﬁrm costs(through strike action, for
example).
Freeman and Medoff (1984) offer an complementary view of unions. In a
series of seminal studies, they investigate what they describe as the ‘other face’
of unionism. This view, developed from earlier work by Hirschman (1971)
and Slichter et al. (1960), is coined by Freeman and Medoff as ‘collective
voice’. For example, individuals who face economic problems may use two
methods to solve these problems. The ﬁrst is exit-and-entry. In this instance,
it would imply that the one way in which an individual may make his or
her discontent felt is through quitting his or her job. The second alternative
is what Hirschman called ‘voice’. It emphasizes the use of communication
to lead to better outcomes. A direct implication of this as suggested by
Harcourt et al. (2004) is thatUnion ‘voice’ may be a directmechanism through
which workers ensure that employers comply with labour law. Individual
workers may be aware that their legally mandated rights are not being met,
and may not speak up as they may fear employer retribution may leave
them out of a job. However, through the mechanism of union collective
voice, workers are able to demand their entitlements from employers without
the fear of reprisals. Unions, therefore, serve as a medium for collective
voice that may be better able to speak to management to ameliorate work
conditions, which may include securing higher standards of living for workers
both in the present (paid holidays, bonuses) and in the future (pensions).
The improvement of working conditions is the main channel identiﬁed by
Freeman andMedoff as affecting worker productivity. Voice thus far has been
presented as being unambiguously positive, but there may be instances in
which individual worker voice may lead to inefficient outcomes. Unions in
this case are political institutions, which, if elected democratically, respond
to the needs of their median voter (member). This suggests that they will
bargain with management over the composition of pay packets to reﬂect their
membership’s median preferences over those of the marginal worker, holding
compensation ﬁxed, under the assumption of democratic unions. However,
it must also be acknowledged that under the monopoly view of unions, one
could reallocate compensation towards non-wage beneﬁts, so voice is one of
many competing explanations for increased non-wage remuneration in the
union sector. Nevertheless, evidence for both compliance with labour law and
increases in non-wage beneﬁt holding may only be predicted by adopting the
voice approach to unions.
More recently, Budd (2004, 2007) has argued for a third face of unionism,
that of union facilitation. He suggests that unions not only act as a medium
for the collective voice of workers, but they may also play an important
role in the diffusion of knowledge about existing beneﬁts to which workers
may be entitled. Hirsch et al. (1997) suggest that part of the differential in
compensation between union/nonunion workers may be due to the assistance
unions provide. This is supported by evidence in Budd and Brey (2003),
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who ﬁnd for unionized hourly employees that there is a greater probability
of having heard of the American Family and Medical Leave Act. Budd
and McCall (1997) ﬁnd that unemployment insurance is more likely to be
taken up by union than nonunion members. Thus, the main channel by
which facilitation works is purely by increasing information availability to
workers, either through shop stewards, newsletters or more general union
network effects.
Unions and wages
There is an extensive literature on union/nonunion wage gaps for developed
countries.1 Overall there is a consensus among labour economists that the
union wage gap for the USA is in the range of 10–20 per cent (Fuchs et al.
1998). Lewis (1986b) surveys the research for the USA from 1968 to 1979,
and ﬁnds that after adjusting for differences in characteristics, the union wage
gap ranges from 9.6 to 16.4 per cent. Jarrell and Stanley (1990) take the studies
that Lewis surveyed and perform a meta-analysis for the USA from 1968 to
1979. They ﬁnd that the union wage gap ranges between 8.9 and 12.4 per cent.
Similar magnitudes have been found for other developed countries (Pencavel
1974; Stewart 1983; Robinson and Tomes 1984; Callan and Reilly 1993).
Union status, however, is not randomly determined (Robinson 1989).
Numerous studies have attempted to address this issue with selection methods
such as those proposed by Lee (1978), Heckman (1979) or Lee (1983) with
varying degrees of success (Lewis 1986a). The studies have struggled to
ascertain in which direction the bias is likely to be. Booth and Bryan (2004)
use British data from an employer–employee linked survey, and detect positive
selection into unions, once this is accounted for the union wage premium
disappears. Main and Reilly (1992) use British data to estimate the union
wage gap for females, controlling for selection into unions and employment
status. Once this is taken into account, the wage gap is found to be smaller. The
identiﬁcation of selection effects in this literature is difficult. Unsurprisingly,
this has been due to the difficulty in ﬁnding instruments that shift the
probability of joining a union but not the wage level. Rios-Avila and Hirsch
(2012, 2014) suggest that selection may not necessarily be an issue at either
the mean or the median. However, they suspect that it is likely to be a more
important issue at either tail of the wage distribution.
More recent studies for developed countries have focused on trying to ﬁnd
causal estimates of the union wage gap using regression discontinuity design
procedures. DiNardo and Lee (2004) focus on the results of contested union
elections in enterprises, and they ﬁnd that there are short-run differences in
terms of wages between those that narrowly voted in unions versus those
that rejected them, they ﬁnd near zero wage effects. This approach was then
developed further by Frandsen (2014) who matched the election data with
conﬁdential household information. He concludes that at the establishment
level, data exhibit substantial selection, correcting for this, a narrow election
for unionization leads to a decline in overall payroll. This effect is due
to worker composition, where older and higher remunerated workers exit,
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while younger lower remunerated workers join and stay. Card et al. (2018)
investigate the trends in union effects at the ﬁrst and second moments of the
wage distribution for the USA and Canada. Their sample covers the period
from the 1980s to the 2010s. At the mean, they provide evidence that the union
effects have been declining since the 1980s, and this is compounded by changes
in the sectors that unionized individual work. They ﬁnd that union mean
wage effects are larger in the public sector than the private sector. Coupled
with a decline in union density this suggests that unions play an important
inequality reducing role in the public sector. This is a sharp contrast where
wage differentials have narrowed, thus changes in union density are unlikely
to decrease inequality.
Estimates for union wage differentials and the impact on wage dispersion
were recently surveyed by Freeman (2010) as part of an overview of labour
markets in developing countries. The evidence for Africa predominantly
focused on wage effects. The wage premium in South Africa for unions is
found to range between 8 and 40 per cent at the mean. Moll (1993) estimate
the union wage gap at the mean and ﬁnd the gap to be 24 per cent for black
blue collar workers. Schultz and Mwabu (1998) estimate the union wage gap
across the conditional wage distribution in South Africa, and ﬁnd that the
wage gap for Africans is greater at the lower ends of the pay distribution
and, not surprisingly, decreases with movement up the wage distribution.
Their ﬁndings suggest those at the bottom end of the distribution have seen
their wages increase by 145 per cent, while those in the top decile experience
a more modest 19 per cent advantage. Butcher and Rouse (2001) replicate
the Schultz and Mwabu study with different data and apply more controls.
They ﬁnd that the wage premium monotonically decreases along the wage
distribution. This suggests the existence of a ‘sword-of-justice’ effect, wherein
unions compress the pay distribution. Their estimates suggest that those at
the lower ends of the distribution earn an extra 32 per cent, while those at the
top enjoy a more modest premium of just 6.7 per cent. Finally, the mean wage
gap is found to be 20 per cent. Thus, on the whole, both studies conclude that
the wage distribution is compressed by the presence of unions. Hofmeyr and
Lucas (2001) apply a series of selection correction techniques to the analysis
of the mean wage gap. They ﬁnd, that dependent on the type of correction
mechanism, the wage gap for urban African males increased over the period
1985–1993 from 8 per cent to 20 per cent. Blunch and Verner (2004) report an
estimated wage gap of about 6 per cent for Ghana. Baah (2005) reports that
the Ghana wage gap increased ranges between 7.8 and 12.6 percentage points
in 1992 and 1999. Both studies conclude that unions in Ghana decrease the
dispersion of wages. It is worth noting that all these studies relate to the union
wage gap for the formal sector. Coverage of union wage effects in the informal
sector is, to the best of my knowledge, non-existent, primarily because unions
do not organize in these sectors.
Asian estimates of the union wage gap vary by country. Bhandari (2009)
reports evidence for a small sample of Indian workers and his ﬁndings suggest
a wage gap of 6 per cent for contract workers, while permanent workers secure
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a wage gap of 25 per cent. The wage gap for South Korea is found to be small,
Kleiner and Lee (1997) ﬁnd, using establishment-level data, the wage gap to be
7 per cent. Fields and Yoo (2000) study the evolution of the gap over a period
of rapid union growth using individual-level data. They report that despite
these increases in density, and hence bargaining ability, the gap simply rose
from 3 per cent to 6 per cent. Park (2008) ﬁnds an all-worker wage differential
of 5 per cent, and when disaggregated by gender ﬁnds the gap to be 12 per cent
and 2 per cent for women and men, respectively.
Turning to the Latin American literature, Arbache and Carneiro (1999)
report a wage premium of 5–7 per cent in the manufacturing sector for Brazil.
In contrast, Menezes-Filho et al. (2005) detect a union wage effect of 12 per
cent for Brazil, using establishment-level data. The Uruguayan dictatorship
of 1973–1984 outlawed collective bargaining. Casoni et al. (2005) provide
evidence for Uruguay in the period subsequent to the return of democracy,
ﬁnding that unions increased wages by up to 7.5 per cent. Landerretche et al.
(2011, 2013) report evidence for the union wage differential for Chile using
panel data for 2002–2009. They correct for endogeneity of union status and
ﬁnd that the corrected union wage gap ranges between 18.6 and 24 per cent.
Rios-Avila and Hirsch (2012, 2014) study the union wage effect for Bolivia
and Chile across the wage distribution and apply the Firpo et al. (2009)
decomposition technique, which allows the effects of subsets of variables
to be isolated.2 They ﬁnd that the Chilean union wage gap is immutable
across the wage distribution at about 20 per cent, while the Bolivian raw
union wage gap is found to be between 20 and 35 per cent across the wage
distribution. They ﬁnd in both cases that the wage structure accounts for
about half of the gap, and also note that unions reduce wage dispersion.
Panagides and Patrinos (1994) report the union wage gap in Mexico. They
apply a Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition and determine that the all-worker
union/nonunion wage gap for 1989 is 10.4 per cent. Fairris (2003) reports the
treatment component of a Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition and ﬁnds that the
adjusted union mark-up declined from 19 per cent in 1984 to 14 per cent in
1996.
Unions and non-wage beneﬁts
Freeman (1981) was the ﬁrst study to explicitly examine the effect of unions
on non-wage beneﬁt composition. Using the Expenditures for Employee
Compensation (EEC), an establishment level survey for theUSA, he ﬁnds that
the a priori predictions that non-wage beneﬁts are greater for unionized ﬁrms
is upheld by the data. Workplaces with a union density of 50 per cent have
25–35 per cent higher expenditure on non-mandatory beneﬁts. This raw gap,
once adjusted for levels of total compensation is reduced to 15–20 per cent.
Freeman andMedoff (1984) utilize various individual-level datasets to further
analyse this question,3 and ﬁnd that union members are 24 to 32 percentage
points more likely than nonunion workers to have a pension. Freeman (1984)
uses longitudinal data for the USA and ﬁnds that the both the number of
fringe beneﬁts, and the incidence of pension provision increase for those
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joining a union, while decreases for those leaving a union. Freeman attributes
the lower estimates on wages and non-wage beneﬁts as due to measurement
error in the union variable. He develops a theorem which under certain
assumptions shows that the longitudinal estimates will underestimate the
‘true’ union effect. Montgomery and Shaw (1997) ﬁnd unions to be associated
with a larger incidence of pension beneﬁts. Using longitudinal Canadian data,
Swindinsky and Kupferschmidt (1991) report that unionized workers are 20
per cent more likely to have a pension plan. Miller and Mulvey (1992) report
for Australia, using a longitudinal survey, that the value of fringe beneﬁts
are 13.9 per cent higher for union compared to non-union workers. Kornfeld
(1993) ﬁnds that joining a union in Australia increases the probability of
having a pension. Budd (2004) updates the estimates of unions and fringe
beneﬁts for the USA and ﬁnds that being in a union increases the probability
of having employer-provided health insurance and a pension by 16.4 per cent
and 18.8 per cent respectively. Budd (2005) updates the Freeman (1981) EEC
estimates and ﬁnds that the voluntary beneﬁts are 10.5 per cent higher for
union compared to non-union members. Budd and Mumford (2004) estimate
the effects of unions on family friendly policies. They ﬁnd that unions increase
the probability of parental leave, subsidized childcare, special leave and job-
sharing options.
The literature on non-wage beneﬁts reviewed thus far has focused on
developed countries. For developing countries, Standing (1992) looks at the
incidence of non-wage beneﬁts using establishment-level data for Malaysia.
He ﬁnds that beneﬁts differ not only between union/nonunion workers but
rather that the entitlement to beneﬁts is greater for those unionized by an
industry-level union than at plant level. Baah (2005) ﬁnds that Ghanaian
trade unions signiﬁcantly increase access to medical, and non-wage beneﬁts
by 41 to 48 percentage points. Fairris (2006) reports evidence forMexico using
establishment level data for 1992 and 1999. He ﬁnds that for the period prior
to NAFTA, unionized establishments offered beneﬁts 140 per cent higher
than non-union establishments, and after liberalization this had decreased to
26 per cent. Fairris (2007) further exploits the establishment data to look at
the value of fringe beneﬁts as a proportion of compensation, and ﬁnds that
unions lower this proportion relative to the nonunion sector. The difference is
found to be 0.2 per cent in 1992. However, after trade liberalization, this had
widened to 7.2 per cent. Fairris suggests that a lack of research in the area for
developing countries is to a large extent due to the unavailability of detailed
surveys.
The extant evidence on non-wage beneﬁts and wages reviewed thus far in
the literature is exclusively based on the concept of a differential between
the union and non-union sector using cross-sectional data. This article
aims to look beyond the concept of the gap between the two sectors
and investigate the wage and non-wage beneﬁt gain (loss) associated with
transitioning to (from) a union job using longitudinal data. This is a gap
which both the developing country literature has not considered to date to my
knowledge.
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3. Data
The analysis in this article utilizes the Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y
Empleo (ENOE), a nationally representative labour force survey carried out
by the INEGI, the Mexican government statistics agency. The survey follows
a complex sample design. It is a two-stage self-weighting sample. The ﬁrst
stage stratiﬁes over geographical areas, while in the second stage, households
are randomly selected for inclusion in the survey. Each quarter one-ﬁfth of
households in the sample are dropped and a new cohort is introduced. Each
cohort is interviewed for ﬁve consecutive quarters. Thus, every survey quarter
contains ﬁve cohorts at different points of their respective interview cycle.
Unfortunately, the survey only includes the question on union membership
in the expanded questionnaire, which is only administered once every
calendar year. For the purposes of this article, I restrict the sample to those
individuals for whom there are two extended questionnaire responses one
year apart. In all instances, this leaves only two temporal observations per
period. During the ﬁrst ﬁve quarters of ENOE’s existence, households were
interviewed using the expanded questionnaire, subsequent applications of
the expanded questionnaire have been restricted to once every four quarters.
The present study exploits exclusively the between-year transitions. By taking
this approach, it ensures that only one single year over change is exploited in
estimation. There are 14 editions of the expanded questionnaire during the
period of this study.4 It is worthwhile remarking that this is guaranteed by only
selecting those individuals who had their ﬁrst interview and ﬁfth interview,
respectively. So although alternate cohorts may be selected with differing
time periods, these would overweight the proposed analysis by the earlier
time period, as well as exacerbate any potential concerns of misclassiﬁcation
error.
The speciﬁc question that individuals were asked was: ‘In this job do you
belong to a union?’ Note that this question is asked separately for main jobs
and any other jobs that an individual holds. This article is only concerned
with the response relating to an individual’s primary job as this is the one
for which the union decision is most likely to be relevant. The questions
pertaining to mandated non-wage beneﬁts are as follows: ‘In this job do you
receive (bonus | paid holidays)?’ and ‘Although you may not use it in this job do
you receive a retirement fund (pension)?’ The nature of the questions asked
limit the scope of the analysis. No further information regarding the value
of these beneﬁts is asked in the survey questionnaire. Thus, I solely focus on
the extensive margin of of these non-wage beneﬁts rather than their value
or magnitude.
The nature of the pensions question must be regarded with care. Mexico
since 1997 has a deﬁned contributions pension system. Workers who are
registered with the Mexican IMSS are automatically enrolled for a pension,
regardless of an individual opting-in. For all workers in the labour market
prior to 1997, their pension would have been migrated to the privately
managed pension funds available. Contributions towards this pension will
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automatically be deducted from their base salary, employers have tomatch this
by law, and the government also adds a small proportion to this pot. Note that
workers may also add additional unmatched contributions towards this fund.
Workers may opt to have their mandatory pensions managed by the central
government ‘concentrated’ account, or they may choose among 1 of the 21
private providers to invest their pension. Those opting for the ‘concentrated’
account see their pensions managed by 1 of the 21 private providers, on a
rotating three month basis. Given this automatic enrolment, this question
must therefore be interpreted with caution, any changes to this variable
may be interpreted in two competing approaches. In the ﬁrst interpretation,
any changes in worker perception of this variable is a consequence of the
facilitation effect, that is changes will be due to increasing worker awareness
of their legal entitlements. Conversely, one could interpret this question as
informing on the receipt of private — that is external to the IMSS scheme
— pension provision. A priori the alternate interpretation of any pension
provision, including state pension should not make sense. This is because
for the present analysis, only workers enrolled in IMSS are considered, and
by deﬁnition are covered by the state pension scheme, however this can
be differentially disentangled by looking at the behaviour of those entering
unions and leaving unions. Presumably, if workers’ awareness of their legal
entitlements is the sole barrier to claiming receiving pension payments, then
those workers who leave a union should perceive no difference in terms of
pension effects.
As hinted above, the nature of the survey creates a challenge for the
construction of a panel dataset. For the ﬁrst six quarters of the survey’s
existence, a large proportion of the whole sample may be tracked. The
proportion that one is able to track depends on the frequency of transitions
one wishes to consider. As in the later years, I am only able to track one-
ﬁfth of the sample between quarters. For the purposes of this article, I have
chosen to look at year-on-year transitions, these are precisely identiﬁed by
exploiting information on the interview order for an individual, focusing on
those individuals for whom ﬁrst and fourth interviews fall within expanded
questionnaire quarters.
The literature suggests that wage determination by unions within the public
sector is markedly different from that in the private sector (Ehrenberg and
Schwarz 1986). This extant literature, coupled with the separate legal regime
which governs public sector workers in the Mexican institutional context, are
the reasons why I restrict the analysis to those wage earners in the private
sector. Public sector unions are subject to a different set of laws (Federal
Law of State Workers) that govern their contracts and their legally mandated
beneﬁts and also subject to parallel but distinct social security institutions, the
Institute of Social Security for State Workers (ISSSTE). A cross comparison
across the two categories would, therefore, conﬂate the power of unions with
the legal differences governing both sectors. This creates a restriction which
must be acknowledged. There may be unobserved selection which is ignored
wherein individuals sort themselves into the public sector and private sector,
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as well as self-employment. I lack the instruments to identify this selection
process. It should be noted that both ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ in the analysis
will be subject to this caveat, thus the estimates presented here can only be
taken as measures of the union gain for the private sector. It bears remarking
that recent evidence from the USA and Canada ﬁnds that the majority of the
union wage differential is in the public sector (Card et al. 2018). The present
analysis focuses on private sector workers, who are of legal working age (16–
65). This means that self-employed individuals, workers in the armed forces,
and domestic service workers are excluded from our sample.
The sample size, once these restrictions have been imposed, is reported in
Table 1. The dataset for the whole time period contains 92,316 observations,
implying there are 46,158 individuals, of which 9,381 transition in and out of
unions over the period 2005–2016.
As outlined earlier the provision of fringe beneﬁts is only mandatory
among those workers who are in the private sector and are covered by IMSS
registration. It should also be noted that all informal workers are, therefore, by
deﬁnition excluded from this sample. Throughout the literature, there is very
little consensus on an exact deﬁnition of informality (see Pradhan and van
Soest 1995; Gasparini and Tornaroli 2009; Loayza and Sugawara 2009). The
multitude of deﬁnitions can be synthesized into two competing views: The
‘Productive’ view of informality, where the informal sector is characterized
by ‘workers in low-productivity jobs in marginal small-scale and often family
based activities’ (ILO 1991). Under this deﬁnition, the formal sector is likely
to be rationed in the number of people it can employ and as such informality
is a by-product of waiting for a covered sector job. The second andmuchmore
recent deﬁnition is recognized by the ILO (2002) and focuses on the legalistic
approach, wherein informality is classiﬁed as being in a state by which one’s
work is ‘not recognised or protected under the law and therefore receive
little or no legal or social protection and are unable to enforce contracts or
have security of property rights . . . [and] are excluded from or have limited
access to public infrastructure and beneﬁts’. This deﬁnition accepts more
broadly that informality is not a simple concept to classify, and as such a
means by which we may observe it is as a residual activity: those who are not
able to avail themselves of the labour laws. In this article, I take the second
approach This is due to the different wage determination process in that
segment of the labour force, and the fact that unionization in this sector is
fairly fragmented. By focusing on those workers with IMSS registration, this
ensures that workers are compliant with the legalistic deﬁnition of formality,
and subject to subsection ‘A’ of the FLL with regard to provision in fringe
beneﬁts.
Following Addison et al. (2013), I deﬁne two new groups ‘Union
Joiners’ and ‘Union Leavers’. Joiners are individuals who are not union
members in time t = 0 but are so in t = 1. Therefore, they are found to
have transitioned into the union sector, and their natural comparison
group are those individuals who have never joined a union. That is, in
both t = 0 and t = 1 they report no union affiliation. Equally leavers are
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TABLE 1
Individual Characteristics of Joiners and Leavers, 2005q1–2016q1
Never
union
Union
joiners
Always
union
Union
leavers
(a) ln(Hourly Wages) in 2010 prices
Pre- and post-transition 3.183 3.314 3.354 3.300
(0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Pre-transition 3.194 3.316 3.373 3.323
(0.004) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)
Post-transition 3.176 3.312 3.344 3.286
(0.003) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
(b) Bonus
Pre- and post-transition 0.560 0.886 0.957 0.868
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Pre-transition 0.557 0.826 0.946 0.912
(0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
Post-transition 0.562 0.922 0.963 0.842
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007)
(c) Paid holidays
Pre- and post-transition 0.242 0.562 0.744 0.537
(0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Pre-transition 0.244 0.449 0.739 0.630
(0.003) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Post-transition 0.241 0.629 0.747 0.481
(0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
(d) Pension
Pre- and post-transition 0.527 0.874 0.952 0.855
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Pre-transition 0.525 0.803 0.948 0.903
(0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007)
Post-transition 0.528 0.916 0.955 0.826
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
(e) Demographic
Age
Under 25 0.24 0.22 0.11 0.17
25–44 0.55 0.60 0.63 0.63
45+ 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.20
Gender
Male 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.92
Female 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08
Married 0.53 0.60 0.73 0.63
(f) Job characteristics
Tenure
Less than 1 year 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.06
1–3 years 0.42 0.41 0.24 0.34
4–6 years 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.20
7–15 years 0.20 0.21 0.28 0.25
15–25 years 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.11
26+ years 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.03
Short contract
temporary contract 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.12
No contract 0.47 0.11 0.03 0.12
Firm size
Micro 0.41 0.08 0.02 0.10
Small 0.29 0.20 0.09 0.22
Medium 0.18 0.30 0.23 0.28
Large 0.11 0.42 0.67 0.39
(Continued)
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TABLE 1
Continued
Never
union
Union
joiners
Always
union
Union
leavers
Sector
Agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing and hunting 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.02
Extractive industry & utilities 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02
Manufacturing 0.22 0.49 0.65 0.48
Construction 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.04
Trade 0.22 0.14 0.06 0.15
Accommodation & food services 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.07
Transportation and warehousing 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.10
Professional, ﬁnancial & corporate services 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.06
Social services 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Other services 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.04
Public administration 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Region
NE 0.11 0.21 0.29 0.22
NW 0.23 0.16 0.11 0.17
West 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.11
East 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.12
CN 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.17
CS 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09
SE 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.09
SW 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04
FIRM
Stayers 0.30 0.35 0.39 0.34
Changers 0.46 0.40 0.35 0.44
N 77,894 4,625 5,041 4,756
Note: All variables are measured at individual level. These data are derived from the extended
questionnaires of the ENOE survey. Standard errors for the means of the outcome variables
are provided in parentheses. For proportions, these standard errors are derived using the
binomial formula.
those individuals who in t = 0 are union members and in t = 1 report
to no longer have a union affiliation. Their comparison group are those
individuals who in both t = [0, 1] report to be in a union. This method for
identifying union status changers does not distinguish between ‘intentional’
and ‘unintentional’ unionization. Intentional unionization is when an
individual seeks out a union, and may occur at the same time as one
changes job. While ‘unintentional’ unionization can take many forms,
perhaps a union arrives at a work place and seeks to organize it, or through
job transitions, where one’s new job happens to be unionized, without
prior intent. These distinctions requires foreknowledge of an individual’s
intent. This information is not included in ENOE. The closest that one can
disentangle this is to look at other changes that occur simultaneously with a
union transition. For illustrative purposes, those transitions will be identiﬁed
by looking at changes in an individual’s self-reported tenure in a ﬁrm. Those
individuals who report having an employer tenure lower than one year and
who were employed in the previous period are assumed to have changed
job.
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Wages are deﬁned as the log of the gross hourly wage, which is an
individual’s gross wage divided by the hours worked. This is deﬂated using
the National CPI for Mexico provided by INEGI. Thus wages are expressed
in December 2010 prices. The coverage of non-wage beneﬁts in the ENOE
survey is limited. The respondent is asked whether they are in receipt of the
following: bonuses or paid holidays. The information regarding pensions
is reported as the availability of a pension regardless of whether or not an
individual is a recipient.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the whole sample of
joining/leaving transitions. It is notable that unlike the average wage gap, the
average wage difference between joiners and never union individuals is about
12.2 per cent prior to joining a union, this gap is increased to 13.6 per cent
after joining a union. This gives a simple difference-in-difference estimate of
joining a union of 1.4 per cent, which is not statistically signiﬁcant. Equally,
the gap between leavers and always union individuals is found to be −5 per
cent in favour of always union members prior to leaving, and this falls to−5.8
per cent, suggesting a difference-in-differences estimate of −0.8 per cent for
the wage loss concept, which is too found to be statistically insigniﬁcant. With
respect to demographic characteristics the average joiner and leaver do not
appear to be dissimilar.
Looking at the distribution of available non-wage beneﬁts between joiners
and never union members, there is a notable difference in the incidence of
provision of these beneﬁts. The unadjusted difference-in-difference estimates,
calculated from Table 1, suggest that union joiners perceive an increase in
the incidence of non-wage beneﬁts in the range of 9.1–18.3 percentage points.
The z statistics for these are 8.3, 11.9 and 9.4 for bonuses, paid holidays and
pensions, respectively. All of these are highly signiﬁcant. For union leavers,
the unadjusted difference-in-differences the decline in incidence of non-wage
beneﬁts is between 8.7 and 15.7 percentage points. Where the relevant z
statistics for these are 7.6, 8.2 and 7.1 for bonuses, paid holidays and pensions,
respectively. All of these are highly signiﬁcant. The largest difference is found
to be in the incidence of paid holidays. This suggests that there are issues
with compliance with FLL in the formal sector. These estimates suggest
that there may be both a union facilitation and union voice effect in action.
Unfortunately, due to limitations with the data, I am unable to investigate
how the magnitude of the reported bonuses vary across joiners/never union
and leavers/always union individuals.
Many of the job characteristics reveal the same pattern. On average union
‘joiners’, ‘leavers’ and ‘always members’ are remarkably similar. The rest
of the labour force, however, appears to be workers without a contract,
predominantly working inmicro ﬁrms (i.e. those with fewer than ten workers).
It should be noted that although a worker may not hold a written contract
the FLL explicitly states that once an employer–employee relation has begun
one is entitled to all of the non-wage beneﬁts described therein. There seems
to much more dispersion across different sectors, unlike for those union
members, concentrated in large ﬁrms, often in the manufacturing sector.
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4. Methodology
As outlined in the previous section, the objective of this article is to investigate
the effects of joining/leaving a union on wages, bonuses, holidays and pension
provision. Let us assume that the outcome of interest, denoted Y, for
individual i in transition year t in quarter q is given as follows:
Yitq = αi + γq + φPt + δUitq × Pt + Xitq ′β + ηi tq (1)
In this particular application, Yitq is either log wages (in December 2010
prices), or the incidence of non-wage beneﬁts (namely Bonus, Paid Holidays
or Pension provision). The vector Xitq contains age and its quadratic, tenure
and its quadratic, marital status, ﬁrm size dummies, contract type, industry
sectoral dummies and state dummies and state quarterly time trends.
The difference-in-differences model presented in expression (1) is a two-
period model where αi is a time invariant unobserved individual effect, γq is
the quarter-year ﬁxed effect, Pt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 where
t = 1. Uitq is a dummy variable which denotes the following two concepts:
Firstly joiners, that is individuals who are not union members in time t = 0
but in t = 1 are found to have transitioned into a union job, and their natural
comparison group are individuals who have never joined a union (that is, in
both t = 0 and t = 1 they report no union affiliation). Secondly, there are
leavers, that is individuals who in t = 0 are union members and in t = 1 they
report as no longer having union affiliation. Their comparison group are those
individuals who in both t = 0, 1 report to be in a union. Thus, the model
will be separately estimated for each group. The vector Xitq is a vector of
individual and job-speciﬁc characteristics. The parameter estimate of interest
from equation (1) is the difference-in-differences estimate, which is given by δ̂.
This estimate is the Average Treated on the Treated estimate (ATT) and may
be interpreted as the wage (non-wage beneﬁt) gain/loss associated with the
union transition. The tables exclusively report the estimates of this parameter.
This parameter is estimated by using a two-period ﬁxed effects model. The
non-wage beneﬁts difference-in-difference parameter is analogous to (1), and
estimated by OLS using a linear probability model.5
It bears remarking that the ATT estimate is by its very nature one which
encapsulates the experience of the marginal worker either joining or leaving a
union relative to their appropriate control group. The successful identiﬁcation
of this effect is conditional on having parallel pre-trends between the treatment
and comparator group, but due to the two-period nature of this analysis, it
is an untestable proposition. Equally, it is worth bearing in mind that the
marginal worker is unlikely to have the same characteristics as that of the
average worker, as can be noted from the differences inmeans in column 3 of 1.
Nevertheless, the ATT by deﬁnition cannot give the Average Treatment Effect
(ATE), or the full union effect. This is to say that the effects under discussion
pertain solely to those who are ‘at risk’ of joining and leaving, due to their
self-selected nature they may not be relevant for those individuals whom never
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unionize, although conceptually related to the population ATE, the ATT does
not inform upon the question ‘What if an individual with population average
characteristics joins a union’. The intention of these estimates is to identify
the effect for those who undergo the treatment.
5. Results
Table 2 presents the estimates for the gains associated with joining a union.
The table presents the estimate for the δ̂ parameter in expression (1). The
estimates are for the pooled transitions over the whole time period 2005q1–
2016q1. Individuals are separated into union ‘joiners’ and union ‘leavers’
with their respective comparison groups being those individuals who have
never been unionized, and those who over the course of the survey always
report belonging to a union. Thus, the estimate gives the ‘short-run’ effect of
unionizing when compared to the group of those individuals who never joined
a union. The row of baseline estimates reﬂect the whole available sample, while
each successive row represents the estimates for a particular sub-sample.
Throughout the analysis presented here, the data will be analysed by
different sub-samples which have been chosen as being more restrictive than
the baseline estimate where all the available observations are used, within the
restrictions outlined above. The sub-samples under consideration include the
disaggregation of contract types (namely permanent, and temporary contracts
only), Business size (namely excluding micro businesses, and permanent
contract and excluding micro businesses) as well as trying to determine
what the effect of ‘intentional’ unionization versus ‘passive’ unionization,
by estimating for the sub-samples of individuals changing ﬁrms and those
remaining in ﬁrms. For the above listed sub-samples, in all instances the
estimates presented here reﬂect exclusively that subset. So for example, the
temporary contract sub-sample only includes joiners or leavers whom in both
t = 0 and t = 1 held a temporary contract.
Over the whole period, the average wage gain for the average union ‘joiner’
is found to be weakly statistically signiﬁcant. I ﬁnd that on average, those
individuals who join a union see their wages increase by 3.7 per cent relative
to never unionized individuals. In order to tease out the effect, I re-estimated
equation (1) on different sub-samples. It can be seen that the wage effects
reported for the overall sample are mainly driven by those individuals who
hold a temporary contract. Temporary workers who unionize see their wages
increase by 21.4 per cent relative to their never unionized counterparts.
‘Never union’ individuals are predominantly clustered in micro ﬁrms, while
union ‘joiners’ are on average more likely to be found among larger ﬁrms.
This poses a potential issue in comparing these two sub-samples as it could
be argued that small ﬁrms have fundamentally different labour relations, and
are unlikely to even have a union presence. However, excluding this particular
sub-sample yields a broadly similar story as that for the aggregate, namely that
there is no short run union wage gain.
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TABLE 2
Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Joining a Union 2005q1–2016q1
Wages Bonus Paid holidays Pension
Baseline 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.123*** 0.056***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010)
N 82,519 82,519 82,519 82,519
Temporary contract 0.194** 0.172*** 0.131*** 0.134**
(0.087) (0.057) (0.050) (0.064)
N 35,189 35,189 35,189 35,189
Permanent contract −0.003 −0.005 0.096*** 0.037***
(0.022) (0.009) (0.028) (0.013)
N 27,583 27,583 27,583 27,583
Exclude micro businesses 0.022 0.027*** 0.117*** 0.048***
(0.017) (0.010) (0.021) (0.011)
N 43,337 43,337 43,337 43,337
Permanent exclude micro −0.007 0.002 0.101*** 0.046***
(0.025) (0.009) (0.030) (0.014)
N 21,755 21,755 21,755 21,755
Firm stayers 0.041 0.005 0.143*** 0.036**
(0.027) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018)
N 24,637 24,637 24,637 24,637
Firm changers 0.031 0.067*** 0.114*** 0.089***
(0.024) (0.016) (0.030) (0.017)
N 37,987 37,987 37,987 37,987
Note: The model speciﬁcation follows (1) in the text. Each column reports the difference-in-
differences (̂δ) estimate obtained from the pooled time sample. This gives the effects of joining
a union independent of the business cycle. The errors for these estimates are clustered at the
municipal level. The regressions reported include the demographic and job-speciﬁc characteristics
outlined in panels (e) and (f) of Table 1. The regressions also include state-speciﬁc time trends.
For deﬁnitions of the dependent variables, see text in Section 3.
***, ** and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The evidence presented for non-wage beneﬁts is the ﬁrst of its kind exploring
the longitudinal impact of joining/leaving a union. The poor macroeconomic
performance of the Mexican economy in the 1980s and 1990s coupled with a
decline in union membership altered the discourse of unions. The rhetoric of
trade unions shifted towards the concept of the ‘social wage’ (Middlebrook
1995). This language suggests that unions seek to maximize non-wage
beneﬁts for their rank-and-ﬁle. This is borne out by the estimates obtained.
Union joiners are consistently and signiﬁcantly more likely to be in receipt of
‘mandatory’ beneﬁts as guaranteed by the FLL. Looking at the whole sample
there is a modest increase in the probability of being in receipt of bonuses of
3.7 percentage points. This suggests a 3.2 per cent increase in the incidence
of bonuses if this is evaluated at the pre-transition average.6 Looking at the
sub-samples conﬁrms a similar pattern. The effect is highest for those in
temporary contracts, while there appears to be no gains to unionization for
those workers who have permanent contracts. This may be explained, in
part, by the legal entitlement that is afforded to permanent workers by the
FLL. These guarantees are undeﬁned for part-time workers and those with
different contract types. Thus, union gains perhaps change the distribution of
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non-wage beneﬁts for those workers. Dependent on the composition of union
membership this could be considered consistent with the union voice effect, if
the median union member is one holding a temporary contract. This would
also explain the magnitude of increased incidence of these effects with respects
to bonuses. Workers on temporary contracts who join a union experience an
increase of 17.2 percentage points in the probability of being in receipt of an
end-of-year bonus, relative to sub-sample of never union workers. This effect,
when evaluated at the relevant pre-transition incidence implies an increase
of 15.2 per cent. As with the estimates for wages, excluding micro enterprises
decreases the corresponding estimated δ̂ parameter. Equally, the effect on
bonuses can only be detected from individuals who change their ﬁrm. Bonuses
in the Mexican context are a real and tangible addition to a worker’s salary.
However, crucially, this fringe-beneﬁt is disbursed only once per annum and
traditionally it is equivalent to at least one month’s wages. It does not count as
a part of the ‘salary’ concept, thus, enjoying higher pay due to a bonus does not
increase other proportional beneﬁts such as employer pension contributions.
A similar pattern is discernible from the other non-wage beneﬁts. Joiners are
found to be 12.3 and 5.6 percentage points more likely to be in receipt of paid
holidays and have private pension schemes available for workers, respectively.
These, when evaluated at their correspondent pre-transition incidences imply
increases of 9.2 and 4.8 per cent, respectively. In these sets of non-wage
beneﬁts, joiners are consistently found to have a higher probability of being in
receipt of these ‘mandatory’ non-wage beneﬁts, even if one has a permanent
contract. These estimates are curious as under the FLL all individuals who
work for ﬁrms should be registered with the IMSS.
However, the estimates suggest that the probability of being in receipt of
these fringe beneﬁts (which should be 100 per cent for all full-time salaried
formal workers) is higher for those who join unions. This suggests that unions
are acting as a mechanism which ensures that employers provide workers with
all of their legal entitlements. Unfortunately, without the ability to further
delve into the magnitude of the non-wage beneﬁts provided I am unable to
determine to what extent union bargaining is increasing the generosity of these
beneﬁts relative to their never union counterparts. Analytically, one could
consider the estimates presented here as being indicative of union facilitation
effects, that is workers once unionized are made aware of their already existing
beneﬁts, so when surveyed about non-wage beneﬁt coverage they change their
response. As discussed earlier, this may be a particular concern with regard
to pension provision as the survey question is vague regarding the pension
concept covered. However, I argue that the ﬁndings for joiners are unlikely to
be indicative of a pure ‘facilitation’ effect. This is because of the salience of
bonuses and paid holidays. A non-wage beneﬁt without immediate effect may
be less salient to workers and thus may have imperfect recollection of what
beneﬁts are provided in their contract. However, bonuses and paid holidays
have direct implications for workers, and through this increased salience,
it is unlikely that non-union individuals would be unaware of their legal
entitlement to these beneﬁts.
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TABLE 3
Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Leaving a Union, 2005q1–2016q1
Wages Bonus Paid holidays Pension
Baseline −0.032 −0.051*** −0.101*** −0.046***
(0.019) (0.012) (0.024) (0.013)
N 9,797 9,797 9,797 9,797
Temporary contract −0.391*** −0.111 0.035 −0.104
(0.125) (0.123) (0.102) (0.115)
N 833 833 833 833
Permanent contract −0.010 0.004 −0.054* −0.015
(0.025) (0.010) (0.028) (0.017)
N 6,851 6,851 6,851 6,851
Exclude micro businesses −0.025 −0.042*** −0.106*** −0.042***
(0.021) (0.011) (0.025) (0.012)
N 8,985 8,985 8,985 8,985
Permanent exclude micro −0.014 0.001 −0.075** −0.023
(0.026) (0.011) (0.029) (0.016)
N 6,493 6,493 6,493 6,493
Firm stayers −0.058* 0.001 −0.075* −0.022
(0.035) (0.018) (0.044) (0.020)
N 3,582 3,582 3,582 3,582
Firm changers −0.007 −0.076*** −0.085** −0.047**
(0.028) (0.022) (0.040) (0.023)
N 3,830 3,830 3,830 3,830
Note: The model speciﬁcation follows (1) in the text. Each column reports the difference-in-
differences (̂δ) estimate obtained from the pooled time sample. This gives the effects of joining
a union independent of the business cycle. The errors for these estimates are clustered at the
municipal level. The regressions reported include the demographic and job-speciﬁc characteristics
outlined in panels (e) and (f) of Table 1. The regressions also include state-speciﬁc time trends.
For deﬁnitions of the dependent variables, see text in Section 3.
***, ** and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The estimated effects of leaving a union are presented in Table 3. The
estimates suggest that for the average individual there is wage loss associated
with leaving a union. However, my estimates suggest that the average union
leaver who remains in their job faces a 5.8 per cent decrease in hourly wages.
Indeed, one of the ways in which unions affect wages is through overtime, if
the same difference-in-differences exercise is performed on hours worked it is
clear that this decrease is unrelated to these, so workers are in fact receiving a
lower pay for the same hours. Individuals who have temporary contracts are
face a 32.3 per cent decrease in hourly wages. However, due to the reduced
sample size, one could argue there is selection on unobservables. For this
subsample if one extends the difference-in-differences exercise to hoursworked
it is clear that this decrease is driven solely by changes in wages. A separate
exercise on hours worked shows that there is actually a signiﬁcant increase of
approximately 5.7 hours associated with leaving a union. This suggests that
the magnitude would be greater were it not for the compensating increase in
hours. The losses of leaving a union are more pervasive with respect to non-
wage beneﬁts.
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The FLL entitles individuals with permanent contracts to an end-of-year
bonus, paid holidays and a pension. As evidenced in Table 1, there is ample
non-compliance in the Mexican labour market. An important contrast from
my ﬁndings is that while joining a union is associated with increases in the
likelihood of being in receipt of these non-wage beneﬁts, so too leaving a
union is uniformly associated with decreases in the probability of receiving
any non-wage beneﬁts. It is worth noting that ﬁrm leaving and union leaving
simultaneously should not affect the receipt of bonuses or paid holidays, as the
law makes provision for individuals to receive the pro rata equivalent for both
of these concepts. Looking at the sub-sample of permanent workers it seems
that the entitlements are upheld for the most part. Of the non-wage beneﬁts
considered, paid holidays are lost upon exit. Equally, there is a reduction of
5.4 percentage points in receiving paid holidays. Evaluating each of these at
the respective incidence of their sub-sample suggests a decline in incidence 3.4
per cent for paid holidays.
From a legal perspective if a worker leaves a permanent contract
simultaneously as the event of leaving a union, they would then lose their
mandatory entitlement to non-wage beneﬁts. The law suggests that a ﬁrm does
not have a statutory obligation to provide paid holidays unless an individual
has been working at the ﬁrm for at least a year. Equally, the bonuses are
meant to reﬂect the period that an individual has been employed with the
ﬁrm. In cases where they have been with the ﬁrm for a period of less than
a year, employees are still entitled to pro rata bonus payments. Considering
the distinction between voice and facilitation effects of unions the results give
a nuanced picture. For those workers for whom mandatory beneﬁts should
not change such as those on permanent contracts, we see no change. Thus, it
could be argued that the estimates provided reﬂect to some extent changes in
contracting for individuals.
The estimates for the sub-sample of ﬁrm ‘stayers’ and ﬁrm ‘changers’
should, to some extent, assuage these concerns. Firm ‘stayers’ are those
for whom the entitlements to these non-wage beneﬁts should be unaffected
by their leaving a union. My ﬁndings suggest that this sub-group is, as
hypothesized, for the most part unaffected by leaving a union, leading me
to conclude that union leavers are being affected due to facing unfavourable
contracts in their new ﬁrms. However, in terms of facilitation, it is those union
individuals who have a heightened awareness of their legal entitlements, so,
for these individuals the loss of mandatory beneﬁts should be considered as
true changes. In the case of pension provision this is concerning for long run
welfare effects.
As a simple exercise to further elaborate this point, I re-estimated the
regressions for those individuals who left and changed ﬁrm, distinguishing by
reason between those who quit and those who lost their job. This sub-sample is
deﬁned as those who changed ﬁrm, and reported having lost their job— either
due to their ﬁrm shutting down, or being made redundant. This sample is
fewer than 350 individuals, and as such inference should be takenwith caution.
Quitters may report quitting for numerous reasons, but these individuals are
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not subject to the same losses of non-wage beneﬁts relative to those who quit
and always remained in a union. However, the same cannot be said of the
sample of individuals who faced involuntary job losses. For this sub-sample
of individuals, there are substantial losses to non-wage beneﬁts due to leaving
a union. They endure a decline in non-wage beneﬁts of 54.7, 12.9 and 8.1
percentage points for bonuses, paid holidays and pensions, respectively. When
these are evaluated at their relative pre-transition means the loss is found to
be a decline in bonuses by 60 per cent, 19.5 per cent for paid holidays and
9 per cent for pensions.
6. Robustness
There are three concerns with regard to the speciﬁcation underlying (1), which
this sub-section will attempt to address. Firstly, the δ̂ parameter captures the
union member effect upon wages or non-wage beneﬁts under the assumption
that, given the controls in vector Xitq , a clean estimate of the effect of the
average outcome of transitions to or from a union is obtained. However,
Table 1 shows that there are marked differences in characteristics, in particular
between those individuals who are never union and those joining. This can be
mitigated to some extent by adopting a matching approach. Secondly, one
may have reservations that the choice of control group may be driving the
results presented thus far. In order to address this, the following estimates are
presented for swapped control groups. Finally, onemay also be concerned that
the δˆ parameter reported may be tainted by the presence of misclassiﬁcation
in the union status of an individual. This would manifest itself through
attenuation bias in the coefficients. To allay this issue, I discuss different
strategies adopted by the longitudinal literature and report estimates of a
series of simulations in which measurement error is randomly introduced.
Conditional Difference-in-Differences
The parameter of interest estimated has been the ATT. In order to control
for differences in observable characteristics between ‘joiners’ and ‘leavers’ the
conditional difference-in-differences procedure is employed, this is outlined in
the Appendix. In practice, the approach that is implemented relies on a two-
step procedure.
In the ﬁrst step, a control function is estimated with a probit model on the
relevant sample in order to obtain the propensity score. The model takes the
following form:
Pr(Ui0q = 1) = 	(X′i0qβ) (2)
where the dependent variable denotes union joiners or leavers and their
relevant control groups at time t = 0. A vector of covariates Xi0q at time t = 0
is then used to control for the initial pre-transition scores, and	(.) is the CDF
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of the normal distribution. From this model the propensity score for the i th
individual is obtained.
These are estimated for the whole sample, and allows me to identify the
region of common support. This sample is kept for the next step. The matches
are ranked in terms of their respective propensity scores. The Epanechnikov
kernel with a bandwidth of 0.06 is used to smooth out the differences between
scores.7
As it is unlikely that there are exact matches this procedure necessitates
the generation of weights. Pairs of observations where the differences in
observable characteristics between treated and control groups (namely (Union
joiners, never union) and (Union leavers, always union)) are small will be given
large weights, while those who are a poor match will be weighted lower.
The second step employs aweighted ﬁxed effects estimator using theweights
obtained from the matching estimator. From this, the ATT parameter is
given by δˆ through running the same model as in (1). While a large portion
of sub-sample selection has been aimed at mitigating differences between
union joiners and never union individuals, the approach considered in this
section formally addresses these differences. The identiﬁcation provided by
this procedure is contingent on the observable characteristics between the two
groups being a sufficient proxy for unobservables. Thus, matching on these
characteristics may help mitigate the role of unobservables. If this assumption
is not met, then the procedure will provide estimates for similar observed
groups, but unobserved heterogeneity will still prevail.
The results of the conditional difference-in-differences are reported in
Tables 4 and 5. These estimates are similar to the results presented thus far
in Tables 2 and 3. However, the association previously found for temporary
contract joiners is upheld by use of this procedure. This ﬁnding is key as it
suggests that unions are effective in protecting some of the most vulnerable
workers in the economy, those with temporary contracts.
The estimated effects of leaving a union are found to be in line with those
obtained from the matched sample of ‘leavers’ and ‘always union’ individuals.
This exercise is notable for this group, as although there appears to be no real
differences in average characteristics between these two groups, the estimates
from the procedure reveal that there are wage effects from leaving a union
for the average worker. When scrutinizing the subgroups, it becomes clear
that this is primarily driven by those workers who leave and happen to be
on temporary contracts. It should be also noted that although the estimates
provided in Tables 4 and 5 rely on a bandwidth of 0.06, alternate bandwidths
within the range [0.04–0.12] have been used, and these do not materially alter
the estimates reported here.
Inverted Control Groups
A concern that might be expressed about the estimates presented thus
far relates to the choice of control group. The act of transitioning union
status is not a laboratory experiment. There may be some ambiguity with
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TABLE 4
Conditional Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Joining a Union 2005q1–2016q1
LHS Wages Bonus Paid holidays Pension
Baseline 0.021 0.036*** 0.106*** 0.056***
(0.019) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011)
N 52,239 52,239 52,239 52,239
Temporary contract 0.146* 0.151** 0.115** 0.156***
(0.082) (0.066) (0.057) (0.059)
N 18,987 18,987 18,987 18,987
Permanent contract −0.013 0.003 0.096*** 0.036***
(0.028) (0.008) (0.028) (0.013)
N 16,775 16,775 16,775 16,775
Exclude micro businesses 0.010 0.029** 0.107*** 0.051***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012)
N 27,803 27,803 27,803 27,803
Permanent exclude micro −0.021 0.008 0.093*** 0.038***
(0.029) (0.009) (0.027) (0.013)
N 13,109 13,109 13,109 13,109
Firm stayers 0.029 0.013 0.121*** 0.038*
(0.024) (0.017) (0.030) (0.021)
N 18,196 18,196 18,196 18,196
Firm changers 0.007 0.061*** 0.095*** 0.085***
(0.031) (0.018) (0.030) (0.022)
N 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046
Note: The model speciﬁcation follows the two-step procedure outlined in the text. The Kernel
utilized in the ﬁrst step was an Epanechnikov with a bandwidth of 0.06. Each column reports
the conditional difference-in-differences (̂δ) estimate obtained from the weighted ﬁxed effects
estimator on the pooled time sample that lies in the region of common support. This gives the
effects of joining a union conditional on observable characteristics between treatment and control
groups (namely never union). The errors for these estimates are obtained from a bootstrapping
procedure with 100 repetitions. The regressions reported include the demographic and job-speciﬁc
characteristics outlined in panels (e) and (f) of Section 3.
***, ** and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
respect to the appropriate comparison group. In order to verify that the
selection of comparison group is not the driving factor with respect to the
ﬁndings discussed, the same models have been re-estimated for a group
where the control groups are swapped. Thus, joiners in this section will be
compared with always union individuals, and mutatis mutandis for union
leavers. Unsurprisingly, there is no union wage gain for newcomers with
respect to established union members. Remarkably, new union joiners do
have an increased probability of holding all of the legally mandated non-
wage beneﬁts relative to their ‘always union’ counterparts. This suggests that
perhaps the compensation effects of unionization may be limited to the gains
made at the time of the unionization event. This ﬁnding holds regardless of the
sub-sample analysed.
The losses associated with leaving a union are robust to the selection of
control group for leavers as well, and become greater when the comparison
group is comprised those individuals who have never unionized. This
deterioration for union leavers is apparent for all the sub-samples, and as such
is independent of contract type and ﬁrm transitions.
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TABLE 5
Conditional Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Leaving a Union, 2005q1–2016q1
LHS Wages Bonus Paid holidays Pension
Baseline −0.054** −0.041*** −0.100*** −0.039**
(0.024) (0.016) (0.025) (0.017)
N 6,449 6,449 6,449 6,449
Temporary contract −0.376** −0.039 0.077 −0.096
(0.177) (0.233) (0.228) (0.203)
N 509 509 509 509
Permanent contract −0.020 0.006 −0.070* −0.014
(0.031) (0.010) (0.037) (0.020)
N 3,976 3,976 3,976 3,976
Exclude micro businesses −0.046* −0.035*** −0.104*** −0.049***
(0.024) (0.013) (0.027) (0.018)
N 5,925 5,925 5,925 5,925
Permanent exclude micro −0.030 0.007 −0.093*** −0.033*
(0.033) (0.011) (0.036) (0.019)
N 3,750 3,750 3,750 3,750
Firm stayers −0.043 0.005 −0.099** −0.011
(0.036) (0.020) (0.048) (0.022)
N 2,605 2,605 2,605 2,605
Firm changers −0.039 −0.042 −0.082* −0.015
(0.033) (0.032) (0.045) (0.029)
N 2,326 2,326 2,326 2,326
Note: The model speciﬁcation follows the two-step procedure outlined in the text. The Kernel
utilized in the ﬁrst step was an Epanechnikov with a bandwidth of 0.06. Each column reports
the conditional difference-in-differences (̂δ) estimate obtained from the weighted ﬁxed effects
estimator on the pooled time sample that lies in the region of common support. This gives the
effects of joining a union conditional on observable characteristics between treatment and control
groups (namely always union). The errors for these estimates are obtained from a bootstrapping
procedure with 100 repetitions. The regressions reported include the demographic and job-speciﬁc
characteristics outlined in panels (e) and (f) of Table 1, with the exception of the ﬁrm change
variable. The regressions also include state-speciﬁc time trends. For deﬁnitions of the dependent
variables, see text in Section 3.
***, ** and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Nevertheless, the results from this exercise further demonstrate that the
effects of transitioning to/from a union are robust to the choice of the
control group.
Classiﬁcation Error
There ﬁnal concern to be addressed is that of classiﬁcation error. This issue
has been raised in the literature, and in particular in the context of measuring
the longitudinal effect of unions. The use of longitudinal data, as in this article,
has been criticized as issues of measurement error in the union status indicator
could create a potential attenuation bias in the δ̂ estimates obtained. This
concern has been treated by Freeman (1984), who under a set of assumptions
shows that the longitudinal estimate of the wage gap will bound the ‘true’ gap,
however, this ﬁndings rests upon the assumption that there is no selectivity of
employers upon the unionization of an establishment. Freeman suggests that
for union joiners, it would imply selecting low productivity individuals, while
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in the case of union leavers this would imply more senior workers leaving and
seniority rules are likely to invalidate this concern. However, recent evidence
by Frandsen (2014) demonstrates such an effect, perhaps invalidating these
two assumptions under which the bounding result holds.
Card (1996) provides estimates of the measurement error in longitudinal
studies for the USA using CPS data in conjunction with a correlated random
effects model with misclassiﬁcation errors. Utilizing this approach, however,
is contingent on knowing something about the rate of misclassiﬁcation across
the distribution of the outcome variable. For Mexico, no such survey exists
that would allow one to have a priori knowledge regarding the rate of
misclassiﬁcation. However, theMexican Statistics Agency when collecting the
ENOE survey utilize a digital collection work ﬂow, which for respondents
being interviewed a second and subsequent visits contrasts answers given with
prior responses, interviewers are then redeployed in the ﬁeld to ensure that
the correct response is coded in survey. The INEGI (2007) report outlines
the collection and critique of the survey. Data collection occurs continuously
throughout the year by teams of dedicated specialists enumerators, who since
2007 have collected all of the data digitally in a palm pilot tablet.8 The data are
collected starting on aMonday of a given week, byWednesday the supervisors
will have critiqued the collected data and veriﬁed it for internal inconsistencies
which may suggest misclassiﬁcation of indicators. If such a discrepancy is
detected enumerators will be sent from Wednesday onwards for re-interviews
of households. Thus, while no re-interview survey is subsequently produced as
in the the case of the CPS, each response in visits t + 1 is validated internally,
and subsequent visits are validated with respect to the initial response. This
suggests that while classiﬁcation errors are still possible, the methods and
practices used by INEGI in the collection of the data seek to minimize
these.
Swaffield (2001) considers measurement error in the British Household
Panel Survey. She utilizes three approaches to deal with the issue. In the ﬁrst,
measurement error is determined contingent on two questions in the survey
in the ﬁrst the respondent is asked directly about trade union membership, in
the second whether they belong to a trade union recognized by management
for collective bargaining. In the present study, there are not such analogous
questions with which to identify ‘true’ union members. However, in the
context of the FLL such questions would not be able to identify ‘true’ union
members. More than one union may be present in a workplace, but the
collective bargaining monopoly is awarded to the ﬁrst union to organize
an establishment. In the second approach, one also adopted by Cai and
Waddoups (2011), the ‘true’ union effect is given by those workers who
report joining a union, while simultaneously changing either employer or job.
These estimates restrict the number of observations, but also fundamentally
change the question being answered. By focusing on those workers who
change jobs/employers the union effect is only mediated by the active route
to unionization, be it because the worker is seeking to join a union, or has
found a better job which happens to be unionized. Nevertheless, estimates
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TABLE 6
Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Joining a Union 2005q1–2016q1, Alternative Control
Group
Wages Bonus Paid holidays Pension
Baseline 0.014 0.044*** 0.119*** 0.071***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.027) (0.014)
N 9,666 9,666 9,666 9,666
Temporary contract −0.087 0.038 −0.066 0.087
(0.112) (0.119) (0.107) (0.080)
N 990 990 990 990
Permanent contract 0.012 0.014 0.127*** 0.034**
(0.026) (0.009) (0.028) (0.016)
N 6,482 6,482 6,482 6,482
Exclude micro businesses 0.005 0.036*** 0.120*** 0.058***
(0.021) (0.012) (0.029) (0.014)
N 8,902 8,902 8,902 8,902
Permanent exclude micro 0.006 0.015 0.121*** 0.032**
(0.026) (0.010) (0.030) (0.016)
N 6,199 6,199 6,199 6,199
Firm stayers 0.000 0.057*** 0.182*** 0.084***
(0.029) (0.020) (0.039) (0.026)
N 3,613 3,613 3,613 3,613
Firm changers 0.045 0.047* 0.100** 0.074***
(0.031) (0.025) (0.042) (0.028)
N 3,576 3,576 3,576 3,576
Note:The control group for joiners in these regressions are always unionmember individuals. The
model speciﬁcation follows the text. Each column reports the difference-in-differences (̂δ) estimate
obtained from the pooled time sample. This gives the effects of joining a union independent of the
business cycle. The errors for these estimates are clustered at the municipal level. The regressions
reported include the demographic and job-speciﬁc characteristics outlined in panels (e) and (f) of
Table 1. The regressions also include state-speciﬁc time trends. For deﬁnitions of the dependent
variables, see text in Section 3.
***, ** and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
for job changers are presented throughout the present analysis in Tables 2,
3, 6 and 7. In all of these tables, the main results presented remain invariant,
namely that there are gains in legally mandated non-wage beneﬁts for union
joiners, and losses for those who leave unions. The ﬁnal strategy adopted by
Swaffield to account for measurement error is to apply averaging on the union
indicator. This strategy relies on having access to the union question for more
than two periods, and due to the restrictions of ENOE, and in particular
the application of the extended questionnaire is not possible using the data
structure already outlined.
In summary one would expect that the introduction of measurement error
in the union status of an individual would bias the estimates of the δ
parameter downwards towards zero. One can illustrate the effect of a random
classiﬁcation error through the use of a simulation. Assume the known state
of joiners is determined at time t = 0, then a random selection is made to
some per cent of the estimation sample. This sub-sample has their union status
altered to its opposite value. So, for example, if one decides to induce n per cent
measurement error in the union variable, a n per cent random sub-sample is
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TABLE 7
Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Leaving a Union, 2005q1–2016q1, Alternative Control
Group
Wages Bonus Paid holidays Pension
Baseline −0.026* −0.057*** −0.122*** −0.054***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012)
N 82,650 82,650 82,650 82,650
Temporary contract −0.135*** −0.189*** −0.114** −0.146**
(0.047) (0.070) (0.057) (0.061)
N 35,032 35,032 35,032 35,032
Permanent contract −0.024 −0.013 −0.098*** −0.007
(0.020) (0.008) (0.024) (0.014)
N 27,952 27,952 27,952 27,952
Exclude micro businesses −0.022 −0.050*** −0.127*** −0.051***
(0.018) (0.011) (0.019) (0.013)
N 43,420 43,420 43,420 43,420
Permanent exclude micro −0.024 −0.010 −0.106*** −0.009
(0.022) (0.009) (0.026) (0.014)
N 22,049 22,049 22,049 22,049
Firm stayers −0.024 −0.048*** −0.140*** −0.058***
(0.027) (0.015) (0.035) (0.017)
N 24,606 24,606 24,606 24,606
Firm changers −0.041* −0.068*** −0.121*** −0.051***
(0.023) (0.019) (0.025) (0.019)
N 38,241 38,241 38,241 38,241
Note: The control group for leavers in these regressions are never union member individuals. The
model speciﬁcation follows the text. Each column reports the difference-in-differences (̂δ) estimate
obtained from the pooled time sample. This gives the effects of joining a union independent of the
business cycle. The errors for these estimates are clustered at the municipal level. The regressions
reported include the demographic and job-speciﬁc characteristics outlined in panels (e) and (f) of
Table 1. The regressions also include state-speciﬁc time trends. For deﬁnitions of the dependent
variables, see text in Section 3.
**, ** and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
selected and their union status is recoded. So if one was a joiner they will be
miscoded as a never union, and vice versa. This sample is then used to estimate
the δ parameter and the simulation exercise is repeated a number of times. If
attenuation bias is a concern, we should observe the parameter being diluted
to zero.
The plots shown in Figures 1a and 1b, report the outcomes of such an
exercise for all of the main outcomes for the baseline regressions reported in
Tables in 2 and 3.9 The results illustrate that the reported results are invariant
to random measurement errors. The graphs show in a solid black line the
resulting parameter estimates given by each simulation with their associated
conﬁdence interval shown in grey. These can be compared to the estimate
obtained from Tables 2 and 3, which is reproduced for clarity as a maroon
dot with its associated conﬁdence interval as a candle stick. As it can be seen,
a 5 per centmisclassiﬁcation in the union status does not change the parameter
estimate in a statistically signiﬁcant manner. A priori, there is no good reason
to assume why the error would be non-random, but if this were the case and
a suitable data generating process could be approximated, then this approach
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FIGURE 1
Plots of Simulations Inducing 5% Measurement Error in Treatment Variable
[Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: These plots are the results of a simulation inducing a 5% measurement error on the status
of union joiners/transition at time t = 0. The Measurement error is the symmetric swapping of
an individual’s status. Thus, if one was a joiner and are selected as part of the 5% of recodes, they
would be falsely attributed as never union,mutatis mutandi for leavers. This exercise was repeated
100 times per outcome and sub-sample and then the same difference-in-differences parameter as
given in Tables 2 and 3 was computed 100 times. The black line is the plot of this estimate. The
area shaded in grey is the conﬁdence intervals from these. The estimate given by the red dot and
red conﬁdence intervals are those obtained from the unaltered data, and are reported in Tables 2
and 3. The results illustrate that the reported results are invariant to randommeasurement errors.
A priori, there is no good reason to assume why the error would be non-random, but if this were
the case and a suitable data generating process could be approximated, then this approach would
allow one to bound the size of the ‘true’ effect.
would allow one to bound the size of the ‘true’ effect. Nevertheless, the results
from this exercise, considered alongside the methodological practice in data
collection by INEGI, are compelling evidence that measurement error does
not appear to be a big concern in the present analysis.
7. Conclusions
The empirical analysis undertaken in this article provides evidence on the pay
package gain (loss) associated with joining (leaving) a union inMexico during
a period of deunionization.
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FIGURE 1
Continued.
I use a rich labour force survey of theMexican labour market with a sample
size of 46,158 salaried private employees in the formal sector aged between 16
and 64. The real wage (in 2010 Pesos) is calculated for the hourly wages net
of any non-wage beneﬁts that individuals receive from their main job. A ﬁxed
effects model was applied to see what are the transitional gains in terms of
wages or the probability of receipt of non-wage beneﬁts.
The estimates presented provide a consistent story. With respect to wages,
joiners are found to be better off than their ‘never unionised’ counterparts, but
this ﬁnding is predominantly driven by joiners who hold temporary contracts.
For leavers, I ﬁnd a there is a decline in wages for these same temporary
contract workers, and a marginal ﬁnding for those who leave a union and stay
in their job.
However, workers who exit unions and hold a temporary contract
are subject to a wage decrease of 39.1 per cent, but when matched on
characteristics this effect reduces to 37.6 per cent. This difference remains
despite the approximate 5.7 hour increase in hours worked for the average
union leaver. Thus, the estimates suggest a double effect, fewer wages with
union leavers are now working more hours to achieve this rate.
The real gains (and losses) associated with union status are the non-wage
components of pay packages. Union joiners experience sizeable increases in
the probability of being in receipt of mandatory beneﬁts, such as bonuses
and paid holidays. The magnitudes for these gains vary but range between 3.8
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and 12.3 percentage points, which when evaluated at pre-transition incidence
rates suggest sizeable gains of 3.2–15.2 per cent relative to those individuals
who never unionize. Conceptually trying to disentangle between union voice
and union facilitation, I suggest that due to the salience of bonuses and paid
holidays to workers it is more likely that union voice is driving the increases
in non-wage beneﬁt holding, as opposed to increased awareness of existing
beneﬁts due to unionization. Consistent with a different proﬁle of the median
union member it appears that the workers who stand to beneﬁt most are
those for whom beneﬁts are not guaranteed under the FLL. Union leavers are
found to have a lower probability of holding non-wage beneﬁts. This trend
is detected in a consistently lower probability of holding legally mandated
beneﬁts, regardless of whether one has been at the same ﬁrm or not. These
ﬁndings again are contrary to the predictions of the facilitation effect, as union
leavers should be those workers who have a heightened awareness of their legal
entitlements. Thus, the decline in beneﬁts for those who leave a union and
change job at the same time must be interpreted as non-compliance with the
law.
The ﬁndings presented in this article suggest that despite the decline in
union membership over the last decade, unions have adapted their bargaining
strategies. Union rhetoric of increasing a worker’s ‘social wage’ has some
merit, andmay help an individual maintain their living standards. Further, the
evidence presented here suggests that unions are still an important institution
in theMexican labour market. In the absence of strong regulation they ensure
that workers who decide to unionize see their compensation package reﬂect
their legal entitlement. Individuals who choose to leave unions effectively trade
these beneﬁts, perhaps in exchange for retaining their wages at a previously
union determined level.
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Notes
1. For an exhaustive review of the earlier literature, see Lewis (1963, 1986a).
2. However, even with this approach, there remains an identiﬁcation problem,
where estimates for sub-groups of variables are sensitive to the base group used
in estimation.
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3. Namely the CPS, the National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men, the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics and the Quality of Employment Survey.
4. These are 2005q1–2006q2, 2007q2, 2008q2, 2009q1, 2010q1, 2011q1, 2012q1,
2013q1, 2014q1, 2015q1 and 2016q1.
5. It is worth noting that in certain contexts the usage of difference-in-differences
model to obtain the ATT will yield biased standard errors. Bertrand et al. (2004)
identify such a scenario, where there is a limited number of groups for whom
the treatment occurs. In their context the assignment group of the treatment is
akin to a policy occurring in a given geographic unit and the treatment being
attributed to residents in that unit. Their concerns regard difference-in-differences
with a small n and a large t, the context in this article is different as we have a
multitude of individuals for whom each period are observed to be unionized, or
not. Nevertheless one commonly identiﬁed solution to these concerns is to account
for the correlation across treatment units by clustering the data up by one level
(Angrist and Pischke 2009). So in this instance all of the estimates presented here
have been clustered at the municipal level.
6. This extensivemargin can be computed bymultiplying themean proportion prior to
transition by the estimated coefficient δ̂ of joiners. The relevant proportion for this
calculation is available in Table 1, and is 88.6 per cent. So, 0.886 × 0.037 = 0.032.
7. It should be noted that the choice of bandwidth may affect the results of this
approach. However, in this particular application alternate bandwidths spanning
the range [0.04,0.12] were employed, and the results are not signiﬁcantly altered.
These are available from the author upon request.
8. Prior to this the data were collected on paper and pencil. For some areas where the
enumerators deem necessary the data are still collected in paper format. However,
this is then digitized and critiqued for internal consistency in responses.
9. The simulations were run in fact for all of the sub-samples, however, these are not
reported here, but are available from the author upon request.
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Appendix A: Conditional Difference-in-Differences
The differences-in-differences estimate δ̂ is theATT. Thismay be re-cast within
the Rubin (1974) framework of potential outcomes as follows
ATT ≡ E(y1iq − y0iq |Ui = 1)
= E{E(y1iq − y0iq |Ui = 1, Xi )|Ui = 1}(by iterated expectations)
= E{E(y1iq |Ui = 1, Xi ) − E(y0iq |Ui = 1, Xi )|Ui = 1}
= E{E(y1iq |Ui = 1, Xi ) − E(y0iq |Ui = 0, Xi )|Ui = 1}
This may be simpliﬁed as:
= E(δX|Ui = 1) (A1)
The propensity score version of the ATT may be expressed as follows:
ATTpsm ≡ E(y1iq − y0iq |Ui = 1)
= E{E(y1iq − y0iq |Ui = 1, p(Xi ))|Ui = 1}(by iterated expectations)
= E{E(y1iq |Ui = 1, p(Xi )) − E(y0iq |Ui = 1, p(Xi ))|Ui = 1}
= E{E(y1iq |Ui = 1, p(Xi )) − E(y0iq |Ui = 0, p(Xi ))|Ui = 1} (A2)
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Thus, the expression in (A1). The difference lies in the use of a control
function p(Xi ) which allows one to compute the propensity score. Thus,
one estimates a probit containing the Xi vector of characteristics. From
this procedure, one takes the sample of individuals that lie in the common
support region, 0 < pˆ(Xi ) < 1, discarding all individuals forwhom pˆ(Xi ) = 1.
However, it is unlikely that one may ﬁnd exact matches. Thus, one must use
the distance between matched treated and control units as a weighting factor.
Smith and Todd (2005) show that the typical matching estimator can be
expressed as:
δˆ
psm
ATT =
1
n1
∑
i∈I1∩Sp
= [y1iq − Eˆ(y0i |Ui = 1, p(Xi ))] (A3)
= 1
n1
∑
i∈I1∩Sp
= [y1iq −
∑
j∈I0
W(i, j )y0 j , I1] (A4)
where I1 is the set of status changers, and their control group is denoted by I0.
The region of common support is Sp, and n1 the number of individuals in the
set I1 ∩ Sp. Finally,W(i, j ) is the weights derived from the distance ofmatched
observation i and j given by the estimated pˆ(Xi ) and pˆ(Xj ), respectively.
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